This article is taken from LA Times

By Martin Jacques

The dynamics of President Obama’s trip to China were markedly different from those evident on visits made by President Clinton and President George W. Bush. This time the Chinese made clear that they were unwilling even to discuss issues such as human rights or free speech. Why? The relationship between the countries has changed: America feels weak and China strong in their bilateral ties. This is not a temporary shift that will reverse itself once the U.S. has escaped from its mountain of debt. Rather, it is the expression of a deep and progressive shift in the balance of power between the two nations, one that is giving the Chinese — though studiously cautious in their approach — a rising sense of self-confidence.

Nor should we be surprised by the Chinese response. They may have appeared more conciliatory on previous visits by American leaders, but that was largely decorative. The Chinese have a powerful sense of their identity and worth. They have never behaved toward the West in a supplicant manner, for reasons Westerners persistently fail to understand or grasp.

Ever since the Nixon-Mao rapprochement, and through the various iterations of the Sino-American relationship over the subsequent almost four decades, there has been an overriding belief in the West that eventually China would become like us: that, for example, a market economy would lead to democratization and that a free media was inevitable. This hubristic outlook is deeply flawed, but it still prevails, albeit with small cracks of self-doubt starting to appear.

The issue here is much deeper than Western-style democracy, a free media or human rights. China is simply not like the West and never will be. There has been an underlying assumption that the process of modernization would inevitably lead to Westernization; yet modernization is not just shaped by markets, competition and technology but by history and culture. And Chinese history and culture are very different from that of any Western nation-state.

If we want to understand China, this must be our starting point.

The West’s failure to understand the Chinese has repeatedly undermined its ability to anticipate their behavior. Again and again, our predictions and beliefsabout China have proved wrong: that the Chinese Communist Party would fall after 1989, that the country would divide, that its economic growth could not be sustained, that its growth figures were greatly exaggerated, that China was not sincere about its offer of “one country two systems” at the time of the hand-over of Hong Kong from Britain — and, of course, that it would steadily Westernize. We have a long track record of getting China wrong.

The fundamental reason for our inability to accurately predict China’s future is our failure to understand its past. Although China has described itself as a nation-state for the last century, it is in essence a civilization-state. The longest continually existing polity in the world, it dates to 221 BC and the victory of the Qin. Unlike Western nation-states, China’s sense of identity comes from its long history as a civilization-state.

Of course, there are many civilizations — Western civilization is one example — but China is the only civilization-state. It is defined by its extraordinarily long history and also its huge geographic and demographic scale and diversity. The implications are profound: Unity is its first priority, plurality the condition of its existence (which is why China could offer Hong Kong “one country two systems,” a formula alien to a nation-state).

The Chinese state enjoys a very different kind of relationship with society compared with the Western state. It enjoys much greater natural authority, legitimacy and respect, even though not a single vote is cast for the government. The reason is that the state is seen by the Chinese as the guardian, custodian and embodiment of their civilization. The duty of the state is to protect its unity. The legitimacy of the state therefore lies deep in Chinese history. This is utterly different from how the state is seen in Western societies.

If we are to understand China, we must move beyond the compass of Western reality and experience and the body of concepts that has grown up to explain that history. We find this extremely difficult. For 200 years the West, first in the shape of Europe and then the United States, has dominated the world and has not been required to understand others or The Other. If need be it could always bully the latter into submission.

The emergence of China as a global power marks the end of that era. We now have to deal with The Other — in the form of China — on increasingly equal terms.

China, moreover, is possessed, like the West, with its own form of universalism. It long believed that it was “the land under heaven,” the center of the world, superior to all other cultures. That sense of self, which has engendered a powerful self-confidence, has been persistently evident over the last 40 years, but with China’s rise, it is becoming more apparent as the country’s sense of achievement and restoration gains pace. Or to put it another way, when the presidents of China and the United States meet in Beijing in 2019, with the Chinese economy fast approaching the size of the American economy, we can be sure that the Chinese sense of hubris will be far stronger than in 2009.

But long before that, we need to try and understand what China is and how it behaves. If we don’t, then relations between China and the United States will never move beyond the polite and the formal — and that will be a bad omen for the future relationship between the two countries.

Martin Jacques is the author of “When China Rules the World: the End of the Western World and the Birth of a New Global Order.”

President Richard Nixon of the United States of America visited the People’s Republic of China at the invitation of Premier Chou En-lai of the People’s Republic of China from February 21 to February 28, 1972. Accompanying the President were Mrs. Nixon, U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers, Assistant to the President Dr. Henry Kissinger, and other American officials.

President Nixon met with Chairman Mao Tse-tung of the Communist Party of China on February 21. The two leaders had a serious and frank exchange of views on Sino-U.S. relations and world affairs.

During the visit, extensive, earnest and frank discussions were held between President Nixon and Premier Chou En-lai on the normalization of relations between the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China, as well as on other matters of interest to both sides. In addition, Secretary of State William Rogers and Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei held talks in the same spirit.

President Nixon and his party visited Peking and viewed cultural, industrial and agricultural sites, and they also toured Hangchow and Shanghai where, continuing discussions with Chinese leaders, they viewed similar places of interest.

The leaders of the People’s Republic of China and the United States of America found it beneficial to have this opportunity, after so many years without contact, to present candidly to one another their views on a variety of issues. They reviewed the international situation in which important changes and great upheavals are taking place and expounded their respective positions and attitudes.

The U.S. side stated: Peace in Asia and peace in the world requires efforts both to reduce immediate tensions and to eliminate the basic causes of conflict. The United States will work for a just and secure peace: just, because it fulfills the aspirations of peoples and nations for freedom and progress; secure, because it removes the danger of foreign aggression. The United States supports individual freedom and social progress for all the peoples of the world, free of outside pressure or intervention. The United States believes that the effort to reduce tensions is served by improving communication between countries that through accident, miscalculation or misunderstanding. Countries should treat each other with mutual respect and be willing to compete peacefully, letting performance be the ultimate judge. No country should claim infallibility and each country should be prepared to re-examine its own attitudes for the common good. The United States stressed that. the peoples of Indochina should be allowed to determine their destiny without outside intervention; its constant primary objective has been a negotiated solution; the eight-point proposal put forward by the Republic of Vietnam and the United States on January 27, 1972 represents a basis for the attainment of that objective; in the absence of a negotiated settlement the United States envisages the ultimate withdrawal of all U.S. forces from the region consistent with the aim of self-determination for each country of Indochina. The United States will maintain its close ties with and support for the Republic of Korea; the United States will support efforts of the Republic of Korea to seek a relaxation of tension and increased communication in the Korean peninsula. The United States places the highest value on its friendly relations with Japan; it will continue to develop the existing close bonds. Consistent with the United Nations Security Council Resolution of December 21, 1971, the United States favors the continuation of the ceasefire between India and Pakistan and the withdrawal of all military forces to within their own territories and to their own sides of the ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir; the United States supports the right of the peoples of South Asia to shape their own future in peace, free of military threat, and without having the area become the subject of great power rivalry.

The Chinese side stated: Wherever there is oppression, there is resistance. Countries want independence, nations want liberation and the people want revolution–this has become the irresistible trend of history. All nations, big or small, should be equal; big nations should not bully the small and strong nations should not bully the weak. China will never be a superpower and it opposes hegemony and power politics of any kind.

The Chinese side stated that it firmly supports the struggles of all the oppressed people and nations for freedom and liberation and that the people of all countries have the right to choose their social systems according to their own wishes and the right to safeguard the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of their own countries and oppose foreign aggression, interference, control and subversion. All foreign troops should be withdrawn to their own countries. The Chinese side expressed its firm support to the peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in their efforts for the attainment of their goal and its firm support to the seven-point proposal of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam and the elaboration of February this year on the two key problems in the proposal, and to the Joint Declaration of the Summit Conference of the Indochinese Peoples. It firmly supports the eight-point program for the peaceful unification of Korea put forward by the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on April 12, 1971, and the stand for the abolition of the “U.N. Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea.” It firmly opposes the revival and outward expansion of Japanese militarism and firmly supports the Japanese people’s desire to build an independent, democratic, peaceful and neutral Japan. It firmly maintains that India and Pakistan should, in accordance with the United Nations resolutions on the India-Pakistan question, immediately withdraw all their forces to their respective territories and to their own sides of the ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir and firmly supports the Pakistan Government and people in their struggle to preserve their independence and sovereignty and the people of Jammu and Kashmir in their struggle for the right of self-determination.

There are essential differences between China and the United States in their social systems and foreign policies. However, the two sides agreed that countries, regardless of their social systems, should conduct their relations on the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, non-aggression against other states, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. International disputes should be settled on this basis, without resorting to the use or threat of force. The United States and the People’s Republic of China are prepared to apply these principles to their mutual relations.

With these principles of international relations in mind the two sides stated that:
progress toward the normalization of relations between China and the United States is in the interests of all countries:
both wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict;
neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony; and
neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter into agreements or understandings with the other directed at other states.

Both sides are of the view that it would be against the interests of the peoples of the world for any major country to collude with another against other countries, or for major countries to divide up the world into spheres of interest.

The two sides reviewed the long-standing serious disputes between China and the United States. The Chinese reaffirmed its position: The Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the United States; the Government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government of China; Taiwan is a province of China which has long been returned to the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China’s internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere; and all U.S. forces and military installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan. The Chinese Government firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation of “one China, one Taiwan,” “one China, two governments,” “two Chinas,” and “independent Taiwan” or advocate that “the status of Taiwan remains to be determined.”

The U.S. side declared: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese them-selves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes.

The two sides agreed that it is desirable to broaden the understanding between the two peoples. To this end, they discussed specific areas in such fields as science, technology, culture, sports and journalism, in which people-to-people contacts and exchanges would be mutually beneficial. Each side undertakes to facilitate the further development of such contacts and exchanges.

Both sides view bilateral trade as another area from which mutual benefit can be derived, and agreed that economic relations based on equality and mutual benefit are in the interest of the peoples of the two countries. They agree to facilitate the progressive development of trade between their two countries.

The two sides agreed that they will stay in contact through various channels, including the sending of a senior U.S. representative to Peking from time to time for concrete consultations to further the normalization of relations between the two countries and continue to exchange views on issues of common interest.

The two sides expressed the hope that the gains achieved during this visit would open up new prospects for the relations between the two countries. They believe that the normalization of relations between the two countries is not only in the interest of the Chinese and American peoples but also contributes to the relaxation of tension in Asia and the world.

President Nixon, Mrs. Nixon and the American party expressed their appreciation for the gracious hospitality shown them by the Government and people of the People’s Republic of China.

This article is taken from:

Foreign Policy

June 2009

Minxin Pei

“Power Is Shifting from West to East.”

Not really. Dine on a steady diet of books like The New Asian Hemisphere: The Irresistible Shift of Global Power to the East or When China Rules the World, and it’s easy to think that the future belongs to Asia. As one prominent herald of the region’s rise put it, “We are entering a new era of world history: the end of Western domination and the arrival of the Asian century.”

Sustained, rapid economic growth since World War ii has undeniably boosted the region’s economic output and military capabilities. But it’s a gross exaggeration to say that Asia will emerge as the world’s predominant power player. At most, Asia’s rise will lead to the arrival of a multi-polar world, not another unipolar one.

Asia is nowhere near closing its economic and military gap with the West. The region produces roughly 30 percent of global economic output, but because of its huge population, its per capita gdp is only $5,800, compared with $48,000 in the United States. Asian countries are furiously upgrading their militaries, but their combined military spending in 2008 was still only a third that of the United States. Even at current torrid rates of growth, it will take the average Asian 77 years to reach the income of the average American. The Chinese need 47 years. For Indians, the figure is 123 years. And Asia’s combined military budget won’t equal that of the United States for 72 years.

In any case, it is meaningless to talk about Asia as a single entity of power, now or in the future. Far more likely is that the fast ascent of one regional player will be greeted with alarm by its closest neighbors. Asian history is replete with examples of competition for power and even military conflict among its big players. China and Japan have fought repeatedly over Korea; the Soviet Union teamed up with India and Vietnam to check China, while China supported Pakistan to counterbalance India. Already, China’s recent rise has pushed Japan and India closer together. If Asia is becoming the world’s center of geopolitical gravity, it’s a murky middle indeed.

Those who think Asia’s gains in hard power will inevitably lead to its geopolitical dominance might also want to look at another crucial ingredient of clout: ideas. Pax Americana was made possible not only by the overwhelming economic and military might of the United States but also by a set of visionary ideas: free trade, Wilsonian liberalism, and multilateral institutions. Although Asia today may have the world’s most dynamic economies, it does not seem to play an equally inspiring role as a thought leader. The big idea animating Asians now is empowerment; Asians rightly feel proud that they are making a new industrial revolution. But self-confidence is not an ideology, and the much-touted Asian model of development does not seem to be an exportable product.

“Asia’s Rise Is Unstoppable.”

Don’t bet on it. Asia’s recent track record might seem to guarantee its economic superpower status. Goldman Sachs, for instance, expects that China will surpass the United States in economic output in 2027 and India will catch up by 2050.

Given Asia’s relatively low per capita income, its growth rate will indeed outpace the West’s for the foreseeable future. But the region faces enormous demographic hurdles in the decades ahead. More than 20 percent of Asians will be elderly by 2050. Aging is a principal cause of Japan’s stagnation. China’s elderly population will soar in the middle of the next decade. Its savings rate will fall while healthcare and pension costs explode. India is a lone exception to these trends-any one of which could help stall the region’s growth.

Environmental and natural resource constraints could also prove crippling. Pollution is worsening Asia’s shortage of fresh water while air pollution exacts a terrible toll on health (it kills almost 400,000 people each year in China alone). Without revolutionary advances in alternative energy, Asia could face a severe energy crunch. Climate change could devastate the region’s agriculture.

The current economic crisis, moreover, will lead to huge overcapacity as Western demand evaporates. Asian companies, facing anemic consumer demand at home, will not be able to sell their products in the region. The Asian export-dependent model of development will either disappear or cease to be a viable engine of growth.

Political instability could also throw Asia’s economic locomotive off course. State collapse in Pakistan or a military conflict on the Korean Peninsula could wreak havoc. Rising inequality and endemic corruption in China could fuel social unrest and cause its economic growth to sputter. And if a democratic breakthrough somehow forces the Communist Party from power, China is most likely to enter a lengthy period of unstable transition, with a weak central government and mediocre economic performance.

“Asian Capitalism Is More Dynamic.”

Hardly. With the United States brought low by Wall Street and the European economy enfeebled by its welfare state and inflexible labor market, most Asian economies appear in great shape. It is tempting to say that Asia’s unique brand of capitalism, by seamlessly weaving together strategic state intervention, corporate long-term thinking, and insuppressible popular desire for material betterment, will outcompete either the greed-devastated U.S. model or the hidebound European variant.

But though Asian economies-with the notable exception of Japan-are among the fastest-growing in the world today, there’s little real evidence to suggest that their apparent dynamism comes from a mysteriously successful form of Asian capitalism. The truth is more mundane: The region’s dynamism owes a great deal to its strong fundamentals (high savings, urbanization, and demographics) and the benefits of free trade, market reforms, and economic integration. Asia’s relative backwardness is a blessing in one sense: Asian countries have to grow faster because they’re starting from a much lower base.

Asian capitalism does have three unique features, but they do not necessarily confer competitive advantages. First, Asian states intervene more in the economy through industrial policy, infrastructural investment, and export promotion. But whether that has made Asian capitalism more dynamic remains an unresolved puzzle. The World Bank’s classic 1993 study of the region, “The East Asian Miracle,” could not find evidence that strategic intervention by the state is responsible for East Asia’s success. Second, two types of companies-family-controlled conglomerates and giant, state-owned enterprises-dominate Asia’s business landscape. Although such corporate ownership structures enable Asia’s largest companies to avoid the short-termism of most American firms, they also shield them from shareholders and market pressures, making Asian firms less accountable, less transparent, and less innovative.

Finally, Asia’s high savings rates, by providing a huge pool of indigenous capital, undeniably fuel the region’s economic growth. But pity Asia’s savers. Most of them save because their governments provide inadequate social safety nets. Government policies in Asia penalize savers through financial repression (by keeping deposit rates low and paying household savers measly returns on their savings) and reward producers by subsidizing capital (typically through low bank lending rates). Even export promotion, ostensibly an Asian virtue, seems overrated. Asian central banks have invested most of their massive export surpluses in low-yielding, dollar-dominated assets that will lose much of their value due to the long-term inflationary pressures generated by U.S. fiscal and monetary policies.

“Asia Will Lead the World in Innovation.”

Not in our lifetime. If you look only at the growing number of U.S. patents awarded to Asian inventors, the United States appears to have a dramatically receding edge in innovation. South Korean inventors, for example, received 8,731 U.S. patents in 2008-compared with 13 in 1978. In 2008, close to 37,000 U.S. patents went to Japanese inventors. The trend seems sufficiently alarming that one study ranked the United States eighth in terms of innovation, behind Singapore, South Korea, and Switzerland.

Reports of the death of America’s technological leadership are, to paraphrase Mark Twain, greatly exaggerated. Although Asia’s advanced economies, such as Japan and South Korea, are closing the gap, the United States’ lead remains huge. In 2008, American inventors were awarded 92,000 U.S. patents, twice the combined total given to South Korean and Japanese inventors. Asia’s two giants, China and India, still lag far behind

Asia is pouring money into higher education. But Asian universities will not become the world’s leading centers of learning and research anytime soon. None of the world’s top 10 universities is located in Asia, and only the University of Tokyo ranks among the world’s top 20. In the last 30 years, only eight Asians, seven of them Japanese, have won a Nobel Prize in the sciences. The region’s hierarchical culture, centralized bureaucracy, weak private universities, and emphasis on rote learning and test-taking will continue to hobble its efforts to clone the United States’ finest research institutions.

Even Asia’s much-touted numerical advantage is less than it seems. China supposedly graduates 600,000 engineering majors each year, India another 350,000. The United States trails with only 70,000 engineering graduates annually. Although these numbers suggest an Asian edge in generating brainpower, they are thoroughly misleading. Half of China’s engineering graduates and two thirds of India’s have associate degrees. Once quality is factored in, Asia’s lead disappears altogether. A much-cited 2005 McKinsey Global Institute study reports that human resource managers in multinational companies consider only 10 percent of Chinese engineers and 25 percent of Indian engineers as even “employable,” compared with 81 percent of American engineers.

“Dictatorship Has Given Asia an Advantage.”

No. Autocracies, mainly in East Asia, may seem to have made their countries prosperous. The so-called dragon economies of South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Indonesia under Suharto, and now China experienced their fastest growth under nondemocratic regimes. Frequent comparisons between China and India appear to support the view that a one-party state unencumbered by messy competitive politics can deliver economic goods better than a multiparty system tied down by too much democracy.

But Asia also has had many autocracies that have impoverished their countries-consider the tragic list of Burma, Pakistan, North Korea, Laos, Cambodia under the murderous Khmer Rouge, and the Philippines under Ferdinand Marcos. Even China is a mixed example. Before the Middle Kingdom emerged from self-imposed isolation and totalitarian rule in 1976, its economic growth was subpar. China under Mao also had the dubious distinction of producing the world’s worst famine.

Even when you look at autocracies credited with economic success, you find two interesting facts. First, their economic performance improved when they became less brutal and allowed greater personal and economic freedoms. Second, the keys to their successes were sensible economic policies, such as conservative macroeconomic management, infrastructural investment, promotion of savings, and pushing exports. Dictatorship really has no magic formula for economic development.

Comparing a one-party state like China with a democracy such as India is not an easy intellectual exercise. Obviously, India has many weaknesses: widespread poverty, poor infrastructure, and minimal social services. China appears to have done much better in these areas. But appearances can be deceiving. Dictatorships are good at concealing the problems they create while democracy is good at advertising its defects.

So the autocratic advantage in Asia is, at best, an optical illusion.

“China Will Dominate Asia.”

Not likely. China is on course to overtake Japan as the world’s second-largest economy this year. As the regional economic hub, China is now driving Asia’s economic integration. Beijing’s diplomatic influence is expanding as well, supposedly thanks to its newfound soft power. Even China’s once antiquated military has acquired a full plethora of new weapons systems and significantly improved its ability to project force.

Although it is true that China will become Asia’s strongest country by any measure, its rise has inherent limits. China is unlikely to dominate Asia in the sense that it replaces the United States as the region’s peacekeeper and decisively influences other countries’ foreign policies. Its economic growth is also by no means guaranteed. Restive secession-minded minorities (Tibetans and Uighurs) inhabit strategically important areas that constitute almost 30 percent of Chinese territory. Taiwan, which is unlikely to return to China’s fold anytime soon, ties down substantial Chinese military resources. The ruling Chinese Communist Party, which views perpetuating its one-party state as more important than overseas expansionism, is not likely to be seduced by delusions of imperial grandeur.

China has formidable neighbors in Russia, India, and Japan that will fiercely resist any Chinese attempts to become the regional hegemon. Even Southeast Asia, where China appears to have reaped the most geopolitical gains in recent years, has been reluctant to fall into China’s orbit completely. Nor would the United States simply capitulate in the face of a Chinese juggernaut.

For complex reasons, China’s rise has inspired fear and unease, not enthusiasm, among Asians. Only 10 percent of Japanese, 21 percent of South Koreans, and 27 percent of Indonesians surveyed by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs said they would be comfortable with China being the future leader of Asia.

So much for China’s charm offensive.

“America Is Losing Influence in Asia.”

Definitely not. Bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan and mired in a deep recession, the United States certainly looks like a superpower in decline. Its influence in Asia has apparently receded as well, with the formerly mighty dollar in less demand than the Chinese yuan and the North Korean regime openly flaunting Washington’s will. But it is premature to declare the end of U.S. geopolitical preeminence in Asia. In all likelihood, the self-correcting mechanisms in its political and economic systems will enable the United States to recover from its current setbacks.

America’s leadership in Asia derives from many sources, not just its military or economic heft. Like beauty, a country’s geopolitical influence is often in the eye of the beholder. Although some view the United States’ declining influence in Asia as a fact, many Asians think otherwise. Sixty-nine percent of Chinese, 75 percent of Indonesians, 76 percent of South Koreans, and 79 percent of Japanese in the Chicago Council’s surveys said that U.S. influence in Asia had risen over the past decade.

Another, perhaps more important, reason for the enduring American preeminence in Asia is that most countries in the region welcome Washington as the guarantor of Asia’s peace. Asian elites from New Delhi to Tokyo continue to count on Uncle Sam to keep a watchful eye on Beijing.

Whether it’s over blown or not, Asia is poised to increase its geopolitical and economic influence rapidly in the decades to come. It has already become one of the pillars of the international order. But in thinking about Asia’s future, let’s not get ahead of ourselves. Its economic ascent is not written in the stars. And given the cultural differences and history of intense rivalry among the region’s countries, Asia is unlikely to achieve any degree of regional political unity and evolve into an EU-like entity in our lifetime. Henry Kissinger once famously asked, “Who do I call if I want to call Europe?” We can ask the same question about Asia.

All told, Asia’s rise should present more opportunities than threats. The region’s growth not only has lifted hundreds of millions out of poverty, but also will increase demand for Western products. Its internal fissures will allow the United States to check the geopolitical influence of potential rivals such as China and Russia with manageable costs and risks. And hopefully, Asia’s rise will provide the competitive pressures urgently needed for Westerners to get their own houses in order—without succumbing to hype or hysteria.

关于印巴停火以及两国和谈协议，在1998开始的这种谈判下，巴基斯坦与印度双方都在暗地中积极准备大批军事力量，来作为双方的谈判附加值。

而此前，印度首批引进了俄罗斯产MIG29，SU27战斗机。在1996年两国发生的领空冲突中，印度方面的购进自法国的幻影2000－5型战斗机，在 巴基斯坦大多数领空，不断胁迫巴基斯坦的当时装备的所谓最先进的F-16A、歼7战斗机。这些早期型号战斗机不具备类似幻影2000那样的超视距攻击。而 巴基斯坦自身也没有能力来制造中程空对空导弹。

因此巴基斯坦在面对印度拥有的空军优势上的无奈显露无疑。在巴基斯坦首都上空，巴基斯坦 利用地面导航部队与空军结合才最终取得了对于19架进入其领空的印度幻影2000战斗机的胜利。巴基斯坦随后在97年在此象美国提出要求交还8架被扣留在 那里的F16 战斗机。但是华盛顿方面考虑到与印度的重要关系，因此华盛顿据绝了巴基斯坦的要求。

法国作为欧洲最大的巴基斯坦武器供给 国。在此期间，巴基斯坦希望购买120架法国制造的战斗机来抵消印度在空军的优势。但是法国没有采取与巴基斯坦合作的手段。至于俄罗斯方面，俄罗斯根本不 可能舍弃印度这个重要的西亚客户。因此俄罗斯根据印度要求，据绝了为巴基斯坦提供改进型MIG29M这种战斗机。在一切同时，印度提出与巴基斯坦主动和 谈。而巴基斯坦十分明确认为，此时的和谈是完全的被迫局面下的不公平和谈。因此他们据绝了印度的”善意”。

98年中国珠海航展中国公开 展示了一种被称作 “SUPER－7″型MIG21最新的改进型号即后来的啸龙FJ17战斗机。巴基斯坦立刻象中国提出要求联合研制生产这种战斗机其最大制造数量可以达到 120－1200架。中国作为巴基斯坦以往关系密切国家。因此答应了巴基斯坦要求。而巴基斯坦在协议备忘录里特别声明希望，中国尽可能给予巴基斯坦大力支 持挽回失去的时间。

华盛顿当局为了尽快促使巴基斯坦达成与印度停战合作协议。美国不希望由于中国介入节外生枝。因此，美国利用格鲁门公 司与以往中国合作的关系，在此时机重新提出希望参与中国SUPER7战斗机研制。即重新启动所谓”和平典范”计划。但是华盛顿提出的条件是，中国政府必须 拒绝与巴基斯坦合作。而中国却据绝了美国的建议。断绝了与格鲁门可能恢复启动”和平典范”的最后时机。

99年啸龙计划正式开始启动。中国政府集中自己在航空业设计力量40％投入这项计划。在首批第4号验证机试验成功以后，巴基斯坦首先抛下120架的大额订单。随即FJ17战斗机在2006年全面完成引入巴基斯坦生产线路计划。

2000 年巴基斯坦获悉中国当时在开始训练已经秘密部署的55架歼10战斗机，巴基斯坦派遣军事顾问团来华秘密访问，随后在北京、武汉等地观摩了歼10战斗机的全 部作战演示。而中国当时还在为歼10新的型号做进一步改进。巴基斯坦随即提出要求与中国协商采购140架歼10战斗机的可能。

双方随即 开始谈判。巴基斯坦希望歼10战斗机最终可以引进本国化生产。这项谈判另外相关事宜，就是巴基斯坦希望中国在巴境内扩建原有的2座空军基地－”空军中国飞 机维护中心”的基础上在增加至少2座。其投资意愿方式以巴基斯坦提供土地与必要地原材料，中国提供大批经费。与施工设计人员。作为巴中合作援助项目。而中 国当时国库空虚无力全面实施启动这样的浩大工程。
2002年，中国总理讲话称印度应该理解中国的发展。而仅仅2年时间中国国家资本储备据有了几何基数的递增。当时中国拥有了6000亿美元的国家储备。在这个基础上全面的巴基斯坦工程开始实施。

2005 年－2006年。印度与巴基斯坦会谈在此重新开始，此时印度在空军的绝对优势，已经由于中国的技术援助巴基斯坦而全部不负存在。而印度在试图通过俄罗斯阻 断巴基斯坦FJ17战斗机获得来自俄罗斯方面的发动机系统。俄罗斯以试探形式对中国施加压力。但是，中国随后在珠海航展上公布了2种发动机系统，其中一种 就是为FJ改进使用的。因此随即中国政府宣称如果俄罗斯拒绝提供发动机，那么中国将会以自主产品替换俄罗斯产品。并且中国警告俄罗斯以军事技术威胁中国是 “自觉阻断中俄发展的短视之举”随后中国内地与俄罗斯有关多达7项军事谈判项目全面陷入僵局。

中国目前是俄罗斯武器第一大军事买家。在 中东伊拉克问题以后，俄罗斯武器在中东市场早已失去往日辉煌。俄罗斯担心就此会中国这个大买家。俄罗斯当时对华贸易逆差是每年1200亿美元。如果没有军 事弥补。那么这个恐怕要持续增长。而中国在2006 年已经拥有惊人的12850亿庞大国家储备。这是俄罗斯绝对不敢漠视中国据有的庞大购买力度。而中国在 05、06年与欧盟国家中老伙伴法国、新的左翼共产党领导的意大利。纷纷签署了众多的军事合作投资协议。这使得俄罗斯更加担心。因此，俄罗斯被迫在 2006年放弃了自己原有的观点。把印度完全抛在了一边。

对于俄罗斯、俄罗斯很清楚印度永远只能作为他的一个忠实”买家”印度对比中国来说，印度绝对没有中国那样的独立研制能力。因此相对2者利弊来看，印度更加是老实的。而中国则是更加难以满足的。

在2006 年印巴合作最终出台。印度被迫修改了以往很多不符合巴基斯坦利益的条款。而巴基斯坦为了进一步打击印度。在中国同年正式宣布歼10猎装以后，再一次提出购 买歼10战斗机140架计划。这与前面的不同。而早期中国仅仅只能在巴基斯坦建立1座新的基地。而现在两国开始的却是全面合作。

华盛顿当局在 2005年－2006年期间，在中国不断介入巴基斯坦问题下，为了挽回与巴基斯坦造成的裂痕。华盛顿被迫在这种压力下提交全部的16架F16A战斗机给于 巴基斯坦而且，布什总统为了更加弥补，决定将美国海军退役的”提康德罗斯级”导弹驱逐舰赠给巴基斯坦。但是，这一些友善做法，巴基斯坦则是把全部技术资料 提交给他的”老东家”中国。
欧洲评论：两国外交谈判中，实际运营过程中，政治只能起到一定局限作用。而最终决定胜负的还是这两 国军事力量的所占优势。中国在给予巴基斯坦方面的技术下，已经完全改变了以往模式。他们以关键性技术输出替代那些具体成品。例如巴基斯坦目前试射成功地3 型2200公里导弹。这种导弹采用了中国赋予的火箭发动机技术。而中国提交给巴基斯坦的惯性导航技术责备巴基斯坦沿用。
巴基斯 坦目前已经是中国发展来自早期前苏联武器的模式的一种翻版。中国希望巴基斯坦是可以在中国帮助下逐步完善自己的建设体系。而非单纯性质的购买成品。而中国 于巴基斯坦联合研制成品。获利者也包括巴基斯坦。令人惊讶的是巴基斯坦对于中国的”无比信任于忠实”巴基斯坦在提议联合研制FJ17战斗机时期，其国内仅 有3架美国早期提交的首批 F16战斗机。巴基斯坦竟然将这些战斗机秘密送往中国分解，拆卸。一提供给中国研制使用。
因此FJ17很多地方大批消化了F16成熟技术。因此，他的成功是必然的其先进性能也是目前印度所装备的MIge29不能比拟的。巴基斯坦目前已经是世界上第6个可以自行制造中程空对空导弹的国家。而中程空对空导弹则是现代空战必胜的要诀之一。而这些还是要提到中国。
因此可以看出，印度不惜余力的以耗资2300亿美元的总代价，试图还取得以空、海军绝对优势压倒巴基斯坦逼迫巴基斯坦在不平等协议条件下签署协议。这样的战术，在中国的短暂几年介入下，被彻底的”毁灭了”。

This article is taken from:

Foreign Affairs

May/June 2009
Derek Scissors
DEREK SCISSORS is Asia Economics Research Fellow at the Heritage Foundation.

The year 2008 marked the 30th anniversary of the beginning of market reforms in China — and perhaps the third anniversary of their ending. Since the present Chinese leadership took power, market-oriented liberalization has been minor. And as such policies have wound down, they have been supplanted by renewed state intervention: price controls, the reversal of privatization, the rollback of measures encouraging competition, and new barriers to investment.

Why would China, with a generation of successful market reform under its belt, move back toward state control? Because of politics run amok. When the administration of President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao assumed control seven years ago, they acted like any new Chinese regime: they moved to solidify their power through economic stimulus. Only they did not stop. Soon after they took office, lending by state banks and investment by local and national state entities soared. Helped temporarily by very loose global monetary conditions, the Chinese state did well by most economic standards. And success created a constituency in political and business circles that is obsessed with growth at the expense of all else. This growth today is explicitly led by the state, fueled by investment by state-owned entities, and accompanied by powerful regulatory steps meant to ensure the state’s dominance of the economy — all measures that contrast sharply with prior reforms.

The Chinese Communist Party no longer sees the pursuit of further genuine market-oriented reform as being in its interest. The burst of growth that the economy exhibited after the initial state-directed stimulus convinced the CCP that true liberalization is now unnecessary as well as sometimes painful. Whatever the objectives of the Obama administration, it must realize that it will be difficult to change Beijing’s views quickly. True broad-based market-oriented reform in China should remain a long-term goal of U.S. economic policy. But for now, the Obama administration would do better to focus its economic diplomacy on evaluating and responding to the Chinese government’s strategy of aggressively promoting state-led growth. It should not presume that Beijing will return to market reform anytime soon.

The U.S. government cannot afford to get this wrong. Because of the increasing pressure of the global economic crisis, some have called for a policy of partial disengagement. But the U.S.-Chinese relationship is the most important bilateral economic relationship in the world. Together, the United States and China accounted for more than 30 percent of the world’s GDP in 2007. In 2008, bilateral trade stood at $409 billion — dwarfing the $206 billion worth of trade between the United States and Japan — and Chinese exports to the United States amounted to approximately 7.7 percent of China’s GDP. At the end of 2008, Beijing was the largest holder of U.S. Treasuries, with over $700 billion in reserve.

Even incremental improvement in a relationship of this magnitude would have a large economic payoff, all the more so given the recent collapse of the global financial system. This crisis arose in part from imbalances in the U.S.-Chinese economic relationship. (Beginning in late 2002, U.S. monetary policy stimulated already excessive U.S. demand, which served as an even bigger outlet for already excessive Chinese supply. Beijing directly contributed to the prevalence of loose money in the United States by recycling dollars earned from trade into U.S. bonds, a strategy arising from Beijing’s decision to keep China’s capital account closed and the yuan not freely convertible.) At the same time, the situation could get considerably worse if attempts to rectify those imbalances are made too quickly or using the wrong methods. Washington is worried about its ability to continue financing public spending at home, and China, because of the U.S. bonds it holds, is important to that effort; Beijing is worried about maintaining its exports, growth, and, ultimately, high employment, and the U.S. market is crucial to that. The financial crisis has only raised the stakes of getting the U.S.-Chinese economic relationship right.

The question is how best to engage China. Free trade offers opportunities and choices to businesses and consumers; protectionism limits both. The 1930 Smoot-Hawley tariffs are an unforgettable reminder that it would be especially dangerous in the current environment for President Barack Obama to move away from open trade. And so he must engage China — only he must do so while reorienting U.S.-Chinese trade policy in light of Beijing’s lack of interest in discussing issues such as its subsidization of state enterprises and its apparent decision to halt market-oriented reform. Washington should encourage the Chinese to focus on a narrow range of feasible measures. Energy, the environment, and bilateral investment are fine topics for bilateral negotiations, but the agenda should be restructured to emphasize a series of meaningful reforms designed to, for example, liberalize prices, curb state dominance in corporations, shield U.S. companies from mercantilist measures, and allow money to move freely in and out of China. This will be a far more difficult and protracted process than casual calls for the creation of a G-2, or a high-level, informal forum for discussion, suggest. The first step is to understand the true state of the Chinese economy and thus what can be expected of it.

THE VISIBLE HAND

State involvement in the Chinese economy is nothing new — it was a feature even during the reforms under Deng Xiaoping. In 1998, in the wake of the Asian financial crisis and while China was making a bid to join the World Trade Organization, President Jiang Zemin and Premier Zhu Rongji understandably sought to boost investment by Chinese state entities. The difference under Hu and Wen in 2002-8 was that their administration relentlessly advanced the state’s role in the economy despite the absence of an economic slump. But with the concessions needed to accede to the WTO — for instance, lower tariffs — largely implemented by 2005, the state’s more recent advance has effectively forced the market’s retreat. It might seem natural under the present crisis for the Chinese state to extend its reach into the economy, but it has been doing so for years.

Former U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, a perennial optimist, wrote in September 2008 that “China’s leaders today are committed to reform, at least so long as it improves the country’s political and economic stability.” But this is true only if one accepts a very dubious definition of “reform” and ignores overwhelming evidence that reform has stopped. Price liberalization, the core of market reform, has been partly undone. Privatization was stalled at first and then explicitly reversed. Initiatives to increase corporate competition are also being rolled back. The Chinese state is increasingly encroaching on even the relatively open external sector by restricting incoming investments and imposing taxes on exports.

The central government has recently reversed the outstanding progress in the liberalization of prices that China made during the first two decades of reform. The price of labor (wages) remains largely free from government interference, but that is manifestly not the case with the price of capital (the interest rate), for which the People’s Bank of China sets a compulsory and narrow range. Government intervention constantly distorts the prices of basic assets, such as land, often by simply forbidding or promoting transactions. The State Council sets and resets the prices for all key services: utilities and health care, education and transportation. Although the exchange rate has been loosened up over the past three years, the People’s Bank of China sets the daily value at which the yuan must be traded against the dollar. And currency fluctuation is still starkly limited: the daily movement of the yuan against the dollar is not allowed to exceed 0.5 percent. The market in China has never really determined the sale prices of many ordinary goods by itself, and the tendency over the past few years has been to further extend price controls for goods. The state’s complete control over grain distribution has distorted wholesale grain prices; a recent bout of inflation has prompted restrictions on the prices of retail food as well. The energy sector has always been tightly regulated. The government applied price ceilings for coal and oil products, such as gasoline, as global crude-oil prices spiked during the first half of 2008 and then lifted them once prices receded. The newest plan for the energy sector, issued by the State Council in late 2007, reserves the state’s absolute right to set prices.

Likewise, although some Chinese state assets were privatized during the reform era, especially during the mid-1990s, liberalization has never been extensive, and in the third decade of reform, it faded. During 2006 alone, the number of individuals who owned businesses fell by 15 percent, to 26 million — a pittance given the country’s total population of more than 1.3 billion. The latest official data publicly released show that truly private companies contributed less than ten percent of national tax revenues during the first nine months of 2007 and that the figure dropped in the first part of 2008.

Examining what companies are truly private is important because privatization is often confused with the spreading out of shareholding and the sale of minority stakes. In China, 100 percent state ownership is often diluted by the division of ownership into shares, some of which are made available to nonstate actors, such as foreign companies or other private investors. Nearly two-thirds of the state-owned enterprises and subsidiaries in China have undertaken such changes, leading some foreign observers to relabel these firms as “nonstate” or even “private.” But this reclassification is incorrect. The sale of stock does nothing by itself to alter state control: dozens of enterprises are no less state controlled simply because they are listed on foreign stock exchanges. As a practical matter, three-quarters of the roughly 1,500 companies listed as domestic stocks are still state owned.

No matter their shareholding structure, all national corporations in the sectors that make up the core of the Chinese economy are required by law to be owned or controlled by the state. These sectors include power generation and distribution; oil, coal, petrochemicals, and natural gas; telecommunications; armaments; aviation and shipping; machinery and automobile production; information technologies; construction; and the production of iron, steel, and nonferrous metals. The railroads, grain distribution, and insurance are also dominated by the state, even if no official edict says so. In addition, state enterprises draw their top executives from the same pool as does the government. Chinese officials routinely bounce back and forth from corporate to government posts, each time at the behest of the CCP.

Moreover, the state exercises control over most of the rest of the economy through the financial system, especially the banks. By the end of 2008, outstanding loans amounted to almost $5 trillion, and annual loan growth was almost 19 percent and accelerating; lending, in other words, is probably China’s principal economic force. The Chinese state owns all the large financial institutions, the People’s Bank of China assigns them loan quotas every year, and lending is directed according to the state’s priorities.

This system frustrates private borrowers. They might try to raise funds by selling bonds or stocks, but these sales are dominated by the state, too. The volume of bonds issued by the government is more than a dozen times that of bonds issued by corporations; private firms are crowded out. There was a wild bull run on domestic shares in 2006 and 2007 after the government decided to boost the stagnant stock market. But its means of doing so left a huge number of state-owned shares temporarily untradable. With those trading lockups expiring over the course of 2008, a flood of state shares again loomed large over the market, and prices crashed back down to earth. A stock-market rally in early 2009 seemed driven largely by high liquidity; it left the Shanghai Composite Index in late February 66 percent below its peak of October 2007.

REFORM ROLLBACK

One reason the rollback of reform has been overlooked by Washington is that China is officially engaged in a process of restructuring its economy. But this effort has none of the characteristics of market reform. It is aimed at shrinking the number of participants in many industries and expanding the size of the remaining enterprises; through both measures, it will reduce competition. This is not a strategy unique to China: Japan and South Korea have also created so-called national champions, supporting large corporate groups with the idea that their size will make them competitive on the global market. An unspoken corollary of this policy is that private domestic and foreign firms often are prevented from competing with these privileged firms. China has been enamored of the concept of national champions for at least a decade, but even more so since the ascent of Hu and Wen.

The results of this restructuring have been striking. Since the highly publicized contraction of the telecommunications industry from four firms to three, there are now only 17 national enterprises in the oil and petrochemicals, gas, coal, electric power, telecommunications, and tobacco sectors combined. First Aviation Industry and Second Aviation Industry merged; apparently, two firms in that sector was one too many. From cement to retail, all areas are consolidating. Rather than permitting competition to drive down the windfall profits from crude oil and drive out inefficient oil-product suppliers, for example, the National Development and Reform Commission raised taxes on crude for the three state oil giants — which together constitute the entire crude industry — while subsidizing them in the refining sector, where they face small competitors. The state now plays a central role in all oil-related activities in the country.

Economic freedom has also been curtailed by mounting barriers to foreign direct investment (FDI), which began to be erected in late 2005. New FDI transactions began to dry up in 2006 and, save for a few monthly blips, were scarce even before the current economic crisis. Happy official results are distortions. According to government figures, FDI in China rose by more than 13 percent in 2007. The European Union, however, reports that its investment in China plunged from about $7.9 billion in 2006 to about $1.5 billion in 2007. The official FDI figures were driven by funds repatriated by domestic enterprises through Hong Kong and offshore capital centers. And that money was not very productive. The Ministry of Commerce estimated that during the first five months of 2008, total FDI was 55 percent higher than during the same period in the previous year, but investment in fixed assets, where spending has a visible effect, fell four percent over the same period. The increases in FDI in 2008 were largely the result of financial speculation rather than an effort to develop new technologies or create desirable jobs.

This lack of genuine FDI is no accident: Beijing deliberately decided to restrict market access. Its mercantilist tendencies intensified sharply in the fall of 2005, as reflected in the discussion of the sale of minority shares in state banks at the plenary meeting of the CCP’s Central Committee. Then, the pathbreaking acquisition in October 2005 of the state-owned Xuzhou Construction Machinery Group by the Carlyle Group, a U.S. private equity firm, was reversed. Several sales that had previously been approved were vetoed at the March 2006 meeting of the National People’s Congress. Additional industries were designated as “strategic” and thus made off-limits to foreign investors. During the CCP’s plenary meeting in the fall of 2006, this limitation morphed into an outright ban on any type of FDI that threatened “economic security” — a concept that was never defined.

Prior to the March 2007 meeting of the National People’s Congress, the Ministry of Commerce formalized the requirements for foreign acquisitions, which allowed the ministry to ban any proposed purchase that allegedly harmed either China’s economic security or its state assets. The first criterion has the effect of walling off entire sectors of the economy from foreign buyers; the second allows many offers to be rejected as unacceptable. In times when stock prices were soaring, Chinese regulators have said that foreign bids were undervaluing state firms compared to the market. But when share prices have been low, the government has blocked deals on the grounds that the market price was undervaluing state firms. No famous domestic brand can be acquired, and it is the Ministry of Commerce that decides what makes a brand famous — and usually after the offer to buy it has been made. The list of sectors that are regulated in this fashion is even longer than that of sectors the state insists on controlling.

Two recent laws that have been touted as market reforms will in fact place yet more limitations on the activities of foreign companies in China. The new labor law, aimed at enhancing workers’ rights, is being implemented by the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, a xenophobic organ of the CCP that has uniformly ignored abusive behavior by state firms while periodically assailing foreign firms for comparatively minor violations. Despite its nominal purpose, the new antimonopoly law will not promote competition either. Designed to protect “the public interest” and promote “the healthy development of the socialist market economy,” it forbids firms with dominant market shares from buying or selling goods and services at “unreasonable” prices, but it neither defines a market nor offers any method for identifying what is unreasonable. Most telling, the antimonopoly law contains exceptions for all industries controlled by the state and all industries deemed important to national security. It further requires that proposed acquisitions by foreign investors be subjected to both a review on national security grounds and an antitrust probe. Such screenings exist in many countries, but with the CCP’s exceptionally broad definition of “national security,” these are exceptionally sweeping. Also distressing, regulators can suspend or limit intellectual property rights if they deem these to have been abused in the service of creating a monopoly. The Chinese state has long considered many patents unfair, but now it has the legal means to act against them. The government can wield the antimonopoly law against foreign companies or governments that seek to protect intellectual property, as did the U.S. government before the WTO in 2007 and the French company Danone against the China Patent and Trademark Office in 2008.

TRADING FACES

The problems regarding trade are less subtle. If China’s export trade remains largely open and competitive, its import trade still faces some nontariff barriers intended to protect state prerogatives or shelter vital industries, such as energy and agriculture. And then there is the main point of contention in U.S.-Chinese trade relations — in fact, in the entire economic relationship — the exchange rate. The reason for the issue’s contentiousness is its visibility: persistently large trade surpluses for China should push the value of the yuan higher, but this has not occurred because the People’s Bank of China fixes the price of the currency. A broad restarting of financial reform in China would have enormous benefits for the United States — one of which would be a looser hold on the exchange rate by Beijing. Merely liberalizing the exchange rate by itself, however, would not necessarily benefit the United States.

After a 2.1 percent revaluation in July 2005, the yuan climbed by 16 percent against the dollar, peaking almost exactly three years later. But over the same period, it fell six percent against the euro. While the yuan stagnated against the dollar during the second half of 2008, it soared against the euro, at one point climbing 14 percent in just a few weeks of October. In other words, the yuan may be undervalued against other major currencies even more so than it is against the dollar. Thus, it is not clear that allowing a wider daily trading band and calibrating the yuan against a trade-weighted basket of currencies — two stated U.S. goals — would lead to a short-term appreciation of the yuan against the dollar.

An apparent alternative would be for Washington to demand a much larger one-time revaluation to increase the value of the yuan either across the board or against the dollar alone. But this would probably only sidetrack negotiations — and for little benefit. During the first six months of 2005, when the exchange rate was still entirely fixed, the United States ran a $90 billion trade deficit with China. But then, during the first half of 2008, when the yuan neared its peak value against the dollar, the trade deficit exceeded $115 billion. In other words, a more expensive yuan did not prevent the trade imbalance from widening. Although a freer exchange rate is in the United States’ interest in the long term because it would dampen trade imbalances, the Obama administration should be careful what it wishes for now.

A more promising approach to U.S.-Chinese trade issues would be to encourage Beijing to liberalize its capital account, which would allow money to move freely in and out of China. (Together with the current account — the balance of exports and imports of goods and services — the capital account makes up most of a country’s balance of payments.) It was once assumed that the difficult process of liberalizing China’s capital account would occur naturally as the country started complying with the conditions for its accession to the WTO; an open capital account was to be ratified no later than during the 2007 Communist Party Congress. But there has been no progress, and perhaps even a regression, under the Hu-Wen regime. Beijing has showed little interest in allowing multinationals, much less Chinese citizens, to freely send earnings or savings out of the country.

Because capital-account liberalization would allow for the unfettered repatriation of profits, the U.S. business community has long advocated it. But it also offers a less obvious and more important benefit: by forcing financial policy to respond to market behavior, it could considerably reduce state intervention in the Chinese economy. An open capital account would permit capital to exit China, which would constrain the behavior of Chinese banks by draining off some of the guaranteed deposits they now enjoy. That, in turn, would inhibit the type of state-directed lending that has effectively been blocking privatization and subverting competition. Although such liberalization is still far in the future, it is worth pushing for it now.

GROW, GROW, GROW

Market reform has died out in China in part because the country’s leaders have pursued GDP growth at the expense of all else. This decision has had its upsides: were it not for China’s remarkable economic performance over the past three decades, and especially between 2002 and 2008, the country would not be treated as a major economic player. Although export weakness has been the subject of much gnashing of teeth in Beijing, the trade surplus was at $295 billion for 2008 — another annual record on the tail of consecutive monthly surplus records from August through November of that year. According to the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics, between June 2002 and June 2008, China’s GDP more than tripled and its exports more than quadrupled. (The nine percent increase in GDP for the whole of 2008 was considered dangerously slow in comparison.) This rapid GDP growth has created jobs: by the end of June 2008, the unemployment rate among registered urban voters was a mere four percent — even lower than the government’s ambitious target of 4.5 percent. That figure may understate true joblessness by ignoring rural and unregistered urban employment, but it accurately reflects trends in the broader job situation. So many migrant workers from rural areas were absorbed into the urban labor force that the 20 million such workers reported to have lost their jobs in late 2008 still left well over 100 million rural migrants with jobs in cities. Urban wages have climbed significantly, by 18 percent between 2007 and 2008 (unadjusted for inflation) according to official data. The payoff of the wage increase was a 21 percent growth in retail sales (also unadjusted for inflation) during that period.

Of course, there were some drawbacks to six years of furious expansion. Most visible were food and energy inflation. According to official figures, food inflation peaked at 21 percent in April 2008 and energy inflation at a frightening 30 percent in August 2008. Moreover, these official results understated the effects of inflation because price controls on energy have always been in place and were extended to food. Yet even as GDP growth reached and stayed in double digits, job creation surpassed its target, and inflation spiked, fiscal and monetary policies remained intensely expansionist. At the peak of growth, in 2007, monetary policy became increasingly loose, and when GDP growth moderated in 2008, the government rushed to provide fiscal stimulus.

In 2007, inflation-adjusted “real” interest rates began to turn negative — the ultimate sign of a perverse monetary policy — and then became more starkly negative during the first quarter of 2008. The benchmark one-year interest rates set by the People’s Bank of China for borrowing and saving remained fixed despite considerable inflation. At the end of June 2008, official consumer price inflation and producer price inflation were both close to eight percent, whereas the return on a one-year deposit was barely four percent. The January 2008 interbank bond yield was 2.81 percent, and after six months of purported monetary contraction, the July 2008 interbank bond yield was 2.76 percent. Before the financial shock, while the growth rate was still in double digits and the rate of inflation was climbing toward double digits, Beijing was trying to stimulate the economy further.

As consumer inflation began to ebb due to the crisis, real interest rates became less distorted. But this happened while the government was further opening the fiscal tap. China’s urban fixed investment accelerated sharply, rising by 28 percent in the first three quarters of 2008. Its gain for the year as a whole ended up at 26 percent due to much weaker real estate investment at the end of year. Beijing has been determined to move investment growth higher. “We need to actively boost domestic demand, to maintain steady economic growth,” said the economist Wang Tongsan, of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, in August 2008. “Investment is an indispensable part of boosting domestic demand.” This would have been a reasonable position if the baseline from which domestic demand were to be boosted had not been a GDP growth rate above ten percent and if the means of such boosting had not been urban investment growth, which was already at more than 25 percent.

These features suggest that U.S.-Chinese cooperation on energy and environmental concerns may be much more difficult than commonly thought. China wants to protect its environment and shift to cleaner energy sources. But the terrible distortion of its financial system and its excessive investment growth maintain production at levels that consume massive amounts of energy and deplete the environment. And the Chinese leadership is eager to push GDP growth back up to double-digit rates for the sake of creating jobs. In 2007, China began reporting modest increases in energy efficiency and slower rates of degradation in select air- and water-pollution measures. But these have been, and will continue to be, overtaken by economic growth. For example, Beijing has spent lavishly on nuclear, gas, and wind power in an attempt to diversify the country’s energy sources and move away from coal, and it has tried to close small coal mines. Yet coal production jumped from 525 million tons in 2002 to a staggering 1.26 billion tons in 2008. And in August 2008, the State Council emphasized the need for greater annual coal output to support greater industrial production.

GETTING TO YES

With China’s economic policy largely beyond Washington’s reach, the most the Obama administration can control is how to engage the Chinese government. Fortunately, an effective framework for doing this already exists: the Strategic Economic Dialogue (SED), which was created by executive orders by George W. Bush and Hu in September 2006 to complement an increasingly ungainly clutter of high-level bilateral institutions. These include the Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade, which involves the U.S. Department of Commerce, the U.S. trade representative, and China’s vice premier for trade; the Joint Commission Meeting on Science and Technology, which involves the director of the U.S. Office of Science and Technology Policy and the Chinese Ministry of Science and Technology; and the Global Issues Forum, led by the U.S. State Department and the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

With the world’s two largest economies facing so many common and clashing interests on so many issues — trade, investment, energy, the environment, health, and scientific research — such an institutional jumble is only natural. Discussions on traditional economic matters alone require the involvement of the Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade, the Joint Economic Committee, and the Economic Development and Reform Dialogue. This means, on the U.S. side, the involvement of the Departments of Commerce, State, and the Treasury and the trade representative and, on the Chinese side, the involvement of a delegation headed by a vice premier and representatives from the Ministries of Commerce and Finance and the National Development and Reform Commission. Any one issue involves input from several departments: the question of capital-account liberalization, for example, concerns the U.S. Departments of Commerce and the Treasury and the U.S. trade representative as well as the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, the People’s Bank of China, and the National Development and Reform Commission.

It is important that the objectives of different departments be coordinated and that a higher authority be able to negotiate across issues that, if taken individually, might seem intractable. This is the proper role of the SED. Even if Obama favors a more direct and aggressive approach toward China than is currently possible with the SED’s tangled and ponderous ways, it would be advantageous to be able to raise the stakes of, say, a dialogue on energy policy by holding it within the SED or another institution at a similar level. The SED should be maintained or an equivalent body created.

On the other hand, the U.S. Department of the Treasury should no longer play a leading role in the institution; this undercuts the SED’s principal benefits by limiting its reach to that of one cabinet official. The counterpart of a U.S. cabinet secretary is a Chinese cabinet minister, a relatively low position in the CCP hierarchy. Thanks to U.S. efforts, a Chinese vice premier has already become involved in the SED. It would be ideal if the Chinese premier, who heads the State Council and thus all of the relevant bureaucracies, would take the lead in representing China in such discussions. Likewise, the U.S. vice president should be granted real authority to negotiate on behalf of the United States. Short of that, an especially powerful cabinet secretary — from the Treasury, the Commerce, or the State Department — should be given an additional title pertaining to economic policy or China. That would encourage the Chinese government to empower a vice premier to make difficult concessions. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is an ideal choice: she is considered by the Chinese not only to hold a relevant position but also to be more than just a cabinet secretary. In contrast, U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner does not have with Beijing even the clout that former Treasury Secretary Paulson did, who was considered to be a devotee of the U.S.-Chinese relationship.

SED talks should focus on obtaining from the Chinese leadership an explicit long-term commitment to liberalizing interest rates, exchange rates, and energy prices. This would go some way toward addressing China’s underlying economic distortions rather than just a few of their manifestations. Instead of asking an unreceptive audience for sweeping privatization, the Obama administration should pursue more pragmatic and manageable improvements. And it should be forceful in going about this. For example, it should threaten to file complaints with the WTO over the pernicious effects of the Chinese state’s dominant role in the economy if the central government does not make transparent its support for state-owned enterprises, especially larger ones.

The Obama administration should also seek from Beijing a formal commitment that it will open state-dominated companies to foreign investors, even if Beijing insists on some limits. Washington should switch its emphasis from getting Beijing to liberalize its exchange rate to convincing it to liberalize its capital account, and Washington should ask Beijing for a full schedule of steps it will take to open its capital account. The U.S. government should also emphasize that the discriminatory application of China’s new labor and antimonopoly laws against foreign companies is unacceptable. Only after satisfactory results in these areas are achieved can there be progress toward a bilateral investment treaty.

Some current U.S. objectives fly in the face of Beijing’s state-dominated model of development, which the Chinese government has deemed to be very successful. Only modest progress can therefore reasonably be expected for now — or until the flaws of China’s model become more apparent to its devotees. The economic crisis might provide convincing enough evidence, but only if it turns out that China’s recovery lags behind or depends on that of the United States. In any event, true market-oriented reform in China must remain the United States’ ultimate goal, and so the Obama administration must continue to push for the greater liberalization of China’s economy. This will be like pulling teeth in the short term but will greatly speed up the process if and when Beijing is again open to market-oriented reform. Protectionism is not the answer. It would harm the United States too much, even if it harmed China more, and it would be a retreat from leadership. The U.S. government must demonstrate its continued leadership by displaying the confidence that it can thrive in competitive environments at home, on the global market, and in China itself.

Just read this news today.

It’s about a new guide published by the Human Rights Watch(HWR) for the journalists that will be or already on their way to Beijing to cover this coming olympic games.

Spend some time reading this so called Reporter’s Guide to Cover Beijing Olympics, made me think the HWR is really piece of work!

More and more, these international NGOs, AI, HWR, RWB are becoming increasingly aggressive towards China in recent years. I am really sick and tired of their useless bullshit! The so called human rights, freedom of speech, press freedom, democracy, what a load of crap! They think millions of Chinese living in hell, and need their rescuing.

These stupid bunch of morons, are just street dogs after their pethetic bones. Every time when they start pointing their fucking dirty finger at China, as though they have all the moral gounds to them, as though they are the only true and the right one, as though they are the only saver of this world.

But in fact, they are nothing but a bunch of useless white trash.

False translation, media distoration, manipulating news, making up fake stories, oh, that remind me, they are just like CNN.

Anyways, coming back to this reporter’s guide, I have read it through, the only part that actually provide guidence information for reporters is from page 39 – 43. The rest are just plain political government propaganda.

Ignore and minimise any improvements and efforts that China has put in to improve human rights, and maxmise any negative story that China had to show how evil that country is and how deseparate the people must be. These are the typical tricks these NGOs use.

What else can I say, f*** them.

HWR you are a disgrace of this planet, dick!

一个是中国出版的。

一个是日本人的。

文章作者: YST

昨天（６月10日）日本海上保安廳的船隻在釣魚台島附近的海面撞沈了台灣漁船。國府對此低調處理，大陸政府則對日本政府表達嚴重關切與強烈不滿。中國大陸重申對釣魚台島的主權。

釣魚台島也在東海大陸架上，釣魚台島的歸屬與中國東海大陸架的主權是有關聯的。所以 YST再次談論這個話題，我們必須認清東海大陸架的經濟利益、戰略價值和主權退讓導致的嚴重性。

東海大陸架的主權不但攸關國家未來的經濟發展而且關係國家的海域安全。日本是得寸進尺的，在如此重大的利益上中國絕不能退讓。

（一）誤導人心的說法

YST 的「中共領導人與東海油氣田」發表後很多網友提出不同的看法。其中最重要的有三種說法：

一是「商人無祖國說」。這是最荒謬的說法，如果商人無祖國就可以証明國際合作的正當性，那麼國家的主權在哪裏？為什麼日本急著要與中國政府談判？

二是中日共同開發油田具有先例，譬如渤海油田。這個說法是非常誤導的。

三是中國還不夠強大，必須繼續韜光養晦。

第一個說法，「商人無祖國說」使「共同開發」變成家常便飯，於是就成為理直氣壯。這就為贊成中日共同開發東海油氣田提供強有力的根據，YST 完全不能苟同。

第二種說法一點道理也沒有，因為中國已經在東海成功開發了天然氣田日本才提出“合作”要求。

第三種說法也是不對的。中國的軍事再不濟，以中國目前的實力，日本根本不敢主動軍事挑釁。中國沒有必要為了韜光養晦而犧牲重大利益甚至出賣主權。首先中國沒有必要和日本談判，然後即使日本堅持談判，中國也沒有必要急著和日本達成任何協議。北京奧運會日本要來不來都無所謂，過幾年沒人記得。胡錦濤能為了北京奧運會犧牲東海的主權嗎？

（二）中國的國家利益遠高於北京奧運會

中國應該擺出主人的架式，及早宣佈北京奧運會不過是一場遊戲，愛來不來都悉聽尊便，要來的歡迎，不來的拉倒。早來的客人住好旅館，但要預付訂金；晚來的客人住差的旅館，也要預付訂金；預定從速，過時不候，報名時間過了就取消參加資格，毫不客氣。

中國大陸把北京奧運會看得太大了，以致成為外國要脅的對象。這是十分可笑的，這種可笑的要脅是中國自己造成的。

我們不要忘了，1936年國際奧運委員會（IOC）決定在日本舉辦1940年的奧運會，日本也答應了並且開始籌備。這不但是日本第一次主辦奧運會，也是奧運會第一次在亞洲舉行。這個奧運會能說意義不重大嗎？能說日本沒有面子問題嗎？

但是面子算什麼？日本非常清楚他實際的國家利益在那裏，所以後來日本就不要這個面子。日本決定在1937年對中國開戰，接著在1938年對蘇聯開戰，日本為了準備戰爭於是主動通知 國際奧運委員會放棄1940年的奧運主辦權。

看到沒有？國家利益遠高於奧林匹克運動會。日本人非常清楚，如果日本等到1940年奧運完畢以後再發動對華戰爭，中國就多了三年的準備時間，日本將付出更大的戰爭代價。

奧林匹克運動會不過是一場遊戲，怎麼能讓它綁住中國使中國的國家利益蒙受重大損失？

要搞清楚，十年以後絕大部份的人都不會記得今年的北京奧運會。

試問多少人記得1996年的奧運會是在哪裏舉行的？能夠正確回答的絕不到10％。

（三）東海大陸架與琉球海溝

讓我們先看下面這張中國東海的海底地形圖

圖１：中國東海海底地形圖

這張圖非常詳盡和精準，把中國大陸、東海、和琉球群島標示得非常清楚。

我們從這張圖可以清楚看到在東海的爭議區除了釣魚島沒有其他島嶼，所以歸屬權完全決定於海底的結構。圖中顯示整個東海大陸架完全是中國大陸的海底延伸一直到琉球海溝，平均深度 370公尺。釣魚島非常清楚是在東海的大陸架上。

琉球群島西邊深藍色的海域就是著名的琉球海溝，深度2940公尺。

我們看到整個東海大陸架非常整齊地被琉球海溝切斷。所以東海大陸架是非常完整而連貫的從大陸海岸線延伸到琉球海溝，按照國際海洋法的規定，這整片大陸架完全歸屬中國。

（四）中日劃分線的巨大差異

下面這張圖標示中日在劃分東海海域的巨大差異：

圖２：鳳凰衛視劃的中日東海鑽油位址示意圖

鳳凰衛視製作的這幅地圖非常粗糙，最顯著的錯誤是琉球海溝的北端大幅向西傾斜。中國的劃界主張（也就是綠色虛線）不是連接朝鮮半島的東南底部，而是靠近日本的九州島。

YST 喜歡這幅圖是因為它清楚說明中國劃界是根據大陸架的自然延伸，而日本劃界是根據東海的中間線。中國的劃界是根據「國際海洋法」，日本的劃界是根據日本的自由心証。

讓我們看第二張中日劃界圖。

圖３：中日在東海的劃界線和天然氣田的位置

這一張圖把中國主張的劃界線標示得比較準確，天然氣田的產區與中國成功開發的天然氣井都標示得非常清楚。

（五）原則退讓的嚴重性

中國擁有東海大陸架 100％的主權，這是最根本的原則。中國一旦接受日本共同開發的要求，日本再用「白樺」這個日本名字來攪和「春曉」，無形中就淡化了中國在東海大陸架的主權。這是日本的陰謀，也是日本下一步的進逼。外交談判是環環相扣的，邏輯非常嚴密，因此絕對不能在原則上作出任何退讓。

中國一旦在原則上犯了錯誤，那就後患無窮，因為前後因果的關係中國不能自圓其說，很自然就把自己陷入談判的絕境。今天中國的外交軟弱完全被日本看穿，YST 保証日本在下一輪的談判會步步進逼，不會有一點點放鬆。中國自己放棄了原則，別人怎麼會對你客氣？

（六）簡單的算術

我們來算一個簡單的帳：

1.東海最寬處大約三百六十海浬。

2.屬於中國的東海大陸架最寬處３４０海浬，小於「聯合國海洋法公約」的上限３５０海浬。

3.屬於日本的大陸架被琉球海溝切斷，寬只有２０海浬，不得延伸。

4.「聯合國海洋法公約」規定「專屬經濟區（EEZ）」是限制在大陸架上的海域，所以沒有大陸架就沒有所謂的「專屬經濟區」。

5.如果中國承認日本用「專屬經濟區」所畫的中間線，那麼中國就必須承認由這個中間線所劃分的東海大陸架，明確否定琉球海溝的存在。於是中國的大陸架與專屬經濟區就從海岸線延伸的 340海浬退回到 180海浬。

6.減掉２０海浬的琉球海溝，日本的蠻橫算法使中國大陸平白損失 140海浬的大陸架與專屬經濟區，損失的面積達到三十多萬平方公里，相當於三個浙江省或十個台灣省的面積。

7. 中國已成功開發的春曉、斷橋、天外天等油氣田估計儲量高達三千億立方米（探明天然氣儲量至少有 700億立方米），相當於七十二億噸，2005年的價值是五兆（五萬億）美元。胡錦濤政府如果為了日本參加北京奧運會而在如此重大的利益上退讓簡直是開玩笑，如此糊塗和軟弱比滿清政府還不如。

8.東海大陸架還牽涉到漁業與航行的主權，本文就不多說了。

（七）日本的蠻橫無理與惡毒居心

圖４：中國的「春曉氣田」

圖５：春曉氣田中心平台和天外天井口平台

YST必須慎重其事說清楚日本這種說法的謬誤。而且必須點明東海油氣田的特殊性與日本的惡毒居心。

1.「春曉氣田」中國大陸已經完全開發出來，何來與日本共同開發之說？中日合作開發「渤海油田」時，渤海有沒有油還不知道。中國與美國在南海合作開發油田也是一樣，都是從探測的時候就開始合作。「春曉氣田」與「渤海油田」、「南海油田」完全是兩回事。

2.日本居然敢把自己從來沒有參與的「春曉氣田」改名為「白樺氣田」，一個日本名字。這就表明日本對中國在自己的大陸架上開發出來的「春曉氣田」享有主權。你說可惡不可惡？

3.日本是根據日本的主權來要求分「春曉氣田」的一杯羹。這一觀點絕對不能接受。

4.中國在某一輪（中日在「東海油氣田」至少進行了11輪的談判）的談判上曾經對日本提出試探性的建議：

既然日本要跟中國共同開發東海油氣田，那麼我們就把釣魚台海域也包括在共同開發的區域。

日本對中國的建議斷然拒絕。

看到沒有？日本認為他有擁有釣魚台海域的全部主權，所以根本不會跟中國共同開發。日本強行分「春曉氣田」一杯羹是完全基於日本擁有的大陸架主權，中國沒有拒絕的權力。看看前面的海底地形圖，日本的蠻橫態度中國能接受嗎？日本簡直就是一個土匪國家，什麼東西都敢搶，什麼無恥的話都敢說。

所以中國如果同意與日本共同開發東海油氣田，尤其是讓日本分享已經成功開發的「春曉氣田」，就等於承認日本在中國東海大陸架的主權。這是非常嚴重的戰略錯誤，後果不堪設想。

（八）日本根本不可能獨自開發東海的天然氣

圖１的右上角是一個大範圍的海底地形圖，不但包括東海也包括黃海、渤海、還有日本海。從這個地形圖讀者很清楚看到琉球海溝是從台灣的東北角開始一直伸延到日本九州島的西北角。也就是說琉球海溝徹底把日本的從東海大陸架分隔出去。

天然氣不比石油。海上油井可以附設儲油槽，然後由油輪運到世界各處。天然氣則不然。海上氣井開發後必須建立輸送管到用戶。

「春曉氣田」距離浙江寧波大約 350公里，輸氣管長 450公里，輸送途徑是淺海，雖然成本高一點但沒有任何技術問題。

但是對日本而言，任何東海大陸架的天然氣田即使能夠開發出來也無法運到日本，因為輸氣管不但長達千里，而且輸送途徑中間有琉球海溝無法跨越。日本唯一的辦法就是建一個海上天然氣的液化工廠，然後用船將液化天然氣運走。但是在大海上建立天然氣液化工廠以目前的技術根本不可能。

東海的天然氣日本即使看得到也吃不到。

所以不論是從國際法的角度，還是從技術開發的角度，日本要在東海天然氣田上分一杯羹都是癡心妄想。

海上開採油氣的費用非常高昂，勘探、測量、鑽井、舖設管線不但樣樣都是錢，而且具有高風險。舉個例子，在三百五十公尺深的海域鑽井，每一個勘探井的花費是三千萬美元，能不能出油或出氣還不知道。中國在東海大陸架作出巨大的投資與艱苦的工作，日本只在旁邊看。

日本原來的計算是認為中國東海的天然氣田要在2010年以後才會投產，所以打算等待中國什麼都開發完成以後再來爭。日本要撿現成的便宜，而不要擔一分的風險。但是日本沒有想到中國的開發速度很快，在2005年便建成投產，於是眼睛立刻就紅了，搶著提出要求分一杯羹。

其實中國完全不必理會日本的無理要求，因為日本根本不具有開發東海油氣田的條件與技術。日本想用參股的方法來分一杯羹實在是可氣又可笑。日本的要求屬於“見者有份”的強盜行為。

（九）軍事衝突的可能性

圖１這張中國東海海底地形圖太清楚了，日本根本無從置喙。日本人耍賴的方法是「漠視琉球海溝的存在」，把中國大陸和琉球說成是出於同一個大陸架。

那麼，這個2940公尺的海溝是甚麼呢？日本政府說，這不過是“偶然的凹陷”而已。世界上有這種無賴說法嗎？這就是台灣人景仰的日本政府。

如果中國接受日本“偶然的凹陷”這種荒謬的說法而漠視琉球海溝的存在，那麼今天的中國大陸與1900年的滿清政府有什麼不同？YST 將完全喪失對胡錦濤政府的信心。胡錦濤政府比滿清政府還不如，因為滿清政府至少在1895年跟日本打了一場甲午戰爭才簽下割地賠款的馬關條約。

對日本這種無賴國家，談判是沒有任何意義的，因為日本根本不把國際法看作談判的標準，而是用自由心証。對付無賴只有使用武力，中國必須有心理準備。

東海大陸架所牽涉的經濟利益和戰略價值太重要了，中國必須有不惜一戰的決心和勇氣。中國只有不懼戰才能止戰，越是懼戰就越會引發對手得寸進尺，最後免不了仍需一戰。

中國也曾經在這個問題上態度強硬過，譬如2005年09月09日中國派遣由現代級導彈驅逐艦率領的五艘軍艦出現在「春曉油氣田」附近。這是非常正確的行動，日本的態度立刻發生鬆動。展示力量是對付日本的不二法門。

圖６：中國海軍導彈巡防艦巡弋「春曉油氣田」附近海域

YST 看不清楚這艘軍艦的舷號，不過根據艦型這艘軍艦肯定不是現代級，應該屬於較小的飛彈巡防艦。

中日如果在東海發生戰爭，我們可以肯定絕不止是一場海戰，中國一定把戰爭燒到日本的港口和機場。日本艦隊即使在東海能夠倖存也無家可歸。日本贏不了這場戰爭的，一旦開打就有亡國之虞。

（九）結論

「大陸架」指的是海洋底層，牽涉的利益在海底之下，主要是礦產。根據中國的估計，東海油氣田的石油蘊藏量為 250億噸，天然氣蘊藏量八兆四千億立方公尺。

「專屬經濟區」指的是從海底到海面的廣大空間，牽涉的利益在海水中，主要是漁產。YST 沒有東海漁獲量的資料。

除此之外，「專屬經濟區」的主權擁有國在航行管制上享有一定的特權。這航行管制的本身就不是一件小事。

想想看，三十多萬平方公里的大陸架底下有多少礦產資源？

想想看，三十多萬平方公里的「專屬經濟區」有多少漁產利益？

想想看，損失三十多萬平方公里的航行管制權會帶來多大的戰略影響？

YST 不相信會有１％的中國人願意接受如此巨大的損失。開什麼玩笑？能這樣韜光養晦嗎？

中國領導人如果放棄這麼大的主權，毫無疑問應該下台而且被判刑。

解放軍如果眼睜睜放棄這麼大的主權而毫無作為，則根本見不了人。解放軍連頭都抬不起來，就像1931年的東北軍。這是對解放軍的威信最深沈和最無情的打擊。

大陸的網友要用自己的腦子冷靜分析問題，要相信邏輯推理所得到的結果，而不是盲目相信黨和政府。

大陸網友「胡哥」、「胡哥」叫得這麼親熱，連最基本的邏輯推理和扳指頭算算術都不會了。像話嗎？

「商人無祖國」之說完全是混淆視聽的胡說八道。任何商人都不能侵犯國家的主權。

許多網友用過去中日共同開發渤海油田的前例來印証今天中日共同開發東海油氣田的正當性，這也是完全錯誤的。東海油氣田是一個特殊例子，日本是在中國成功開發油氣田之後，以擁有部分主權的姿態來要求分一杯羹。

上面這些說法都是大陸網友盲目護短的行為，為中國外交的軟弱無能保留面子，為中國可能出賣主權的官員塗脂抹粉和開脫罪行。這是最要不得的行為，比承認自己能力不足更不知羞恥。

YST 並沒有號稱中國大陸已經出賣東海大陸架的主權，但是種種跡象顯示有這個可能。這些跡象並非空穴來風，也不是謠言，而是日本政府的正式聲明。日本不但放出空氣中方已經做出較大的退讓，而且首相福田康夫說胡錦濤主席也表示“已經看到解決問題的前景”。日本政府公開宣稱將加緊同中方協商，力爭在７月的北海道高峰會以前達成協議。我跟你打賭日本一定會說如果中國在７月不答應簽字，日本就不參加８月的北京奧運會或不出席開幕式。呵呵呵！

日本官員已經正式公開地高調叫陣，而中國大陸的官員與媒體卻默不吭聲，這就不得不令人懷疑了。中國政府不說話就表示默認，而且任由日方的宣稱延燒和擴大。

中國政府這種作法非常可議。如果日本說的是事實，中國的沈默會鼓勵日本媒體更加搧風點火打擊中國政府的威信和中國人民的自尊；如果日本所言不是事實，中國這個時候不否認會造成日後談判更大的困難。不論何種情況，中國政府在如此重大議題上表現的沈默都是一種錯誤，給自己未來添麻煩，也嚴重打擊現在的民心士氣。

今天這個關鍵時候中國人民必須站出來發出強烈反對的聲音來監督政府，不能盲目地信任政府，更不能等到政府造成事實以後再悔之莫及。事後的追究責任是徒勞無益的，我們要防患於未然。要知道政府必須維護國家的利益，人民也必須關心國家的利益，因為國家的利益就是全國人民的利益。

最新服役的中国远望6号测量船。

真漂亮。

早就听说了，日本人在情报收集，情报处理方面非常专业和细腻。哪怕是最小的，最不起眼的东西，日本人也会尽最大的可能收集到手。

这次四川地震，真是让我领略到了这一点。汶川地震是5月12号，下面这个是日本人在5月23号公布的数据。

太可怕了。